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3.1  Introduction 
There is a growing concern about the productivity, or so-called cost- 
effectiveness, of the health care industry. Health care differs from many 
other industries in that most production takes place in the nonprofit sec- 
tor.' Little is known about the economic forces which determine productiv- 
ity in  the nonprofit  sector, especially compared to that which is known 
about the for-profit sector. There, productivity analysis is well developed, 
especially through recent work stressing the endogenous determination of 
technical change. This paper attempts to analyze the incentives which gen- 
erate productivity differences between nonprofit and for-profit firms. We 
are particularly interested in interpreting some empirical differences be- 
tween nonprofits and for-profits in mixed industries:* 
Tomas Philipson is professor in the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy, the 
Department of Economics, and the Law School at the University of Chicago and a research 
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Darius Lakdawalla is an associate 
economist at the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. 
For their helpful comments, the authors are grateful to Charles Mullin, conference partici- 
pants, and particularly their discussant, Richard Frank. 
1. For a general discussion of the nonprofit sector see, e.g., Clotfelter (1992), Weisbrod 
(1977, 1987, 1988), Hansmann (1980), Powell (1987), Rose-Ackerman (1986, 1996) and the 
references contained therein. For discussions of nonprofit behavior in health care see New- 
house (1970), Pauly and Redisch (1973), Harris (1977), Becker and Sloan (1985),  Dranove 
(1988), Gertler (1989), Gertler and Waldman (1992), and Sloan (2000). 
2. See Sloan (2000) or Malani and Philipson (2000) for a review of the evidence. Further 
work on this subject may be found in Hansmann (1987), James and Rose-Ackerman (1986), 
Easly and O'Hara (1982), Philipson (2000), and Rudney (1987). 
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0  Controlling for quality and quantity, the output of the nonprofit and 
for-profit sectors tend to be perfect substitutes in that they are identi- 
cally priced. 
0  When both firm types coexist in a single industry, nonprofit firms tend 
to operate on a larger scale than for-profit firms. 
0  Nonprofit firms are often observed  to use more inputs per  unit  of 
output, and have consequently larger average and marginal costs. 
0  Nonprofits often are more intensive in their investment in research 
and development (R&D) than for-profits. 
These regularities raise some important questions. In the neoclassical 
analysis of competitive production, more efficient firms tend to be larger 
than less efficient firms, who tend to be driven out of business. It appears 
puzzling, therefore, that nonprofits tend to be larger and less efficient, yet 
they are able to coexist in, if not dominate, industries in which they are 
allowed to operate. It is particularly puzzling that the nonprofit form of 
production dominates industries like short-term health care in the United 
States. It is less puzzling for industries dominated by  for-profits, like the 
U.S. long-term care industry. The prevalence of nonprofit  R&D is  also 
striking in the light of many “property rights” theories, which claim that 
for-profit firms have greater incentives to invest in productivity enhance- 
ments. 
Our analysis aims at interpreting these regularities in an explicit and 
internally consistent framework. We  discuss the implications for produc- 
tivity yielded by the theory of nonprofit firms in Lakdawalla and Philipson 
(1997). The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 analyzes the produc- 
tivity or cost-effectiveness of firms with  “profit-deviating”   preference^.^ 
Building on this analysis, section 3.3 analyzes the productivity differences 
across the nonprofit and for-profit sectors when both firm types coexist in 
a mixed industry. We predict that, when both types coexist, nonprofits are 
larger and less efficient, but nevertheless become more numerous than for- 
profit firms under competitive conditions. In other words, nonprofits drive 
out for-profit firms through competition, although they exhibit higher mar- 
ginal and average costs. This is not inefficient, because we argue that non- 
profits can tolerate prices that are lower than marginal and average costs. 
We can observe direct evidence on such pricing, because in the U.S. non- 
profit sector, sales by  nonprofits  do not cover total costs. For example, 
tuition revenue for most U.S. universities does not cover faculty salaries. 
Section 3.4 expands the analysis to consider the endogenous choice of 
R&D. We predict, contrary to property rights theory, that nonprofit firms 
invest more in cost-reducing R&D than for-profit firms, holding other fac- 
tors, such as third-party  insurance contracts, constant.  Section 3.5 pro- 
3. An early analysis of behavior by firms with profit-deviating preferences for the combina- 
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vides some suggestive and aggregate evidence on the productivity differ- 
ences between the two organizational forms in the short- and long-term 
care industries. 
Both the theory and the evidence differ from the property rights theories 
of nonprofit firm beha~ior.~  Such theories claim that the lack of residual 
claimants (i.e., the inability of nonprofit firms to retain profits) leads to 
inefficient behavior. We argue that such theories ignore the endogeneity of 
nonprofit  status. Firms choose this status; it is not forced upon them. If 
nonprofit  status is inefficient, it is hard to understand  why  it would be 
chosen. We argue that even though nonprofit firms lack residual claimants, 
their dependence on donations provides the same discipline as the depen- 
dence of for-profit firms on investors. We argue that donors are best inter- 
preted as investors who require in-kind, rather than pecuniary, ret~rns.~ 
Just as investors have strong incentives to channel funds into firms that 
will maximize the investors’ objectives, donors also have incentives to fund 
the firms that are most efficient at achieving their objectives, even if those 
objectives are not restricted to monetary reward. Fundamentally, the prop- 
erty rights theory of nonprofit  firms is limited in  two respects. First, it 
assumes that nonprofit status is imposed externally, rather than chosen by 
the firm. Second, it cannot explain why donors to nonprofit firms cannot 
discipline the firms as well as investors in for-profit firms. 
3.2  Cost-Effectiveness and Profit Maximization 
The standard theory of the firm generates the well-known result that 
a profit-maximizing firm also minimizes costs. This section analyzes the 
generalization of this implication to producers or donors who do not aim 
to maximize profits. The main result is that cost-minimization is not pre- 
served when donors have preferences for inputs, although it is preserved 
when donors have preferences for output 
In order to incorporate profit-deviating preferences, we view each firm 
as a single agent with access to a production technology, and preferences 
over output y, an n X  1 vector of inputs x,  and regular consumption z rep- 
resented by  U(y,  x, z). In a for-profit firm, the agent making the decisions 
is the firm’s owner, while in a nonprofit firm, the decision maker is a chari- 
table donor.7 Let the output y be produced from inputs according to the 
production functionflx). Each donor is endowed with a level of real con- 
4. For a classic exposition of this argument, see Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
5. It is well known that private donations are a small share of capital in many health care 
industries in the United States, so this distinction applies mainly outside that sector. 
6.  The analysis also displays that profit-deviating firms may act as if they maximize profits, 
according to an analogy exploited in Philipson and Posner (2000). 
7. We  here make no distinction between ownership and control. In this way,  our theory 
resembles the standard theory of the firm but differs from agency explanations for nonprofits 
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sumption zo  and sells output at a unit price p,  in terms of the numeraire of 
consumption. Formally, the firm solves the problem 
such that 
Y  5  f(x), 
w 0 x +  z  5  zo + py. 
Because the constraints will hold with equality, the problem simplifies to 
max U[f(x),x,z,  +  .rr(x>l, 
where ~(x)  =  pfx) -  wz  denotes profits. The first-order necessary condi- 
tions are, for k = 1,  . . . ,  n; 
These first-order conditions  can  be  seen as generalizing  classic profit- 
maximization conditions if  we recognize that profit deviators operate ac- 
cording to the “net price” of inputs and outputs, in which the net price 
includes both the pecuniary price and the nonpecuniary value of inputs 
and outputs. The nonpecuniary value of output in monetary terms is given 
by U,lU,,  the marginal utility of output normalized by the marginal utility 
of the numeraire good of consumption. The net price of one unit of output 
is thus p* = q,Uw  + p,  the nonpecuniary value of one unit of output plus 
the pecuniary  value. Similarly, the net input price will  be given by  the 
pecuniary price of an input minus its nonpecuniary value, U,lU,.  The net 
price of input k is then w:  = wk  - UJU,.  From this point of view, it is 
apparent that equation (1) generalizes the usual profit-maximization con- 
dition for input use 
It  also  generalizes  the  familiar  first-order  conditions  of  the  cost- 
minimization problem, the equality between the ratio of marginal factor 
products and the ratio of factor prices: 
Firms that do not value inputs (U, = 0 for all k)  continue to minimize 
costs at the pecuniary factor prices w.  Put differently, the net price of  in- Medical Care Output and Productivity in the Nonprofit Sector  123 
puts simply equals the pecuniary price of inputs, so that the firm faces the 
same relative input prices as a profit maximizer. Then an output-preferring 
firm will have the same cost function c(y)  and conditional input demands 
x(w,  y)  as a profit-maximizing firm. The optimal scale of such an output- 
preferring firm is given by 
Using the envelope theorem, the first-order condition for this problem is 
given by 
An output preferrer behaves exactly like a profit  maximizer who faces 
prices p*. Since p* >  p, an output preferrer produces more than a profit 
maximizer. This generates an important implication for long-run firm be- 
havior: All firms will charge a long-run pricep* equal to minimum average 
cost, but output-preferring firms will charge a lower pecuniary price p than 
profit maximizers; therefore, free entry of such firms will drive the long- 
run pecuniary price below minimum average cost. 
Alternatively, if the firm values inputs, cost minimization relative to the 
prices w need not result, because w*  may not be a scalar multiple of  w. At 
a given level of output, an input-preferring firm may have incentives to 
use more of the inputs it prefers, relative to the cost-minimizing levels of 
input use. To illustrate, consider the case of linear preferences: 
U(y,x,z)  = a,y  + a 0 x +  2 
The scalar ay  represents the constant marginal utility of output, and the 
vector  01  represents the marginal utilities of the various inputs. The firm 
behaves as if it faces the vector of input prices w*  = w -  a.  If w*  is not a 
scalar multiple of w, the firm will act as if it faces different relative input 
prices and thus have a cost function c* which differs from the minimum 
cost function c. 
It is frequently argued that nonprofit firms do not behave efficiently, be- 
cause they tend to operate at a larger scale and at greater input cost than 
for-profit firms. We have argued that such behavior is optimal when one 
recognizes that profit maximization is not the objective of the firm. Hold- 
ing constant the output price, a firm which values outputs is of larger scale 
than one which does not. Moreover, holding output price and the level of 
output constant, a firm which values inputs uses more inputs. Therefore, 
the level of inputs per unit of output is higher for both input- and output- 
preferring firms. 124  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
3.3  Productivity Differences in Mixed Industries 
In this section, we  analyze the endogenous decision to enter for-profit 
and nonprofit status, in the context of a long-run competitive model, and 
the differences in productivity across profit status implied by this analysis. 
Since nonprofit status is chosen by profit-deviating firms, the predictions 
about the differences between such firms and profit maximizers will trans- 
late into predictions about the differences between nonprofit and for-profit 
firms. In the mixed industry equilibrium, the nonprofits are predicted to 
be larger, use more inputs per output, have larger average costs, but never- 
theless drive the leaner for-profits out of business. 
3.3.1  Scale Differences under Mixed Production 
For simplicity, we will consider the case in which firms only have output 
preference, because the presence of input-preferring behavior will not sub- 
stantially alter the predictions  about scale differences. Suppose that we 
can index output preference by some parameter ayy  E [0, 11, where ar  = 0 
for a firm which does not value output. Denote by  U(y,  T;  a,) the utility 
firm a,,  derives from output y and profits T.  Let d indicate the regulatory 
choice. of the firm, where d = 1 when a firm chooses to be for-profit and 
d = 0 when it decides to be nonprofit. We denote by d(g,  p)  the preferred 
status of a producer with preferences ay  when the price of output is p. The 
nonprofit sector is defined by a nondistribution constraint and lower input 
costs from tax breaks and donations of capital and labor. More precisely, 
under nonprofit status, the firm is constrained to have economic profits 
below a certain regulated level T  5 nTTR  (we assume T~  = 0), but under for- 
profit status, profits are unconstrained. Cost functions differ across profit 
status: denoting by  cd(y)  the cost function in status d, suppose that co(y) 
5 c'(y)  and c!(y) 5 c:,(y);  holding output fixed, both total and marginal 
costs are lower in the nonprofit sector. This difference in costs represents 
the tax breaks which favor nonprofit firms: For instance, nonprofits have 
lower corporate income, property, and benefit taxes. It also reflects the 
value of  donated capital and labor in the nonprofit sector. If nonprofits 
were to have higher costs than for-profit firms, then in our setting no firm 
would choose to be nonprofit. In such a case, a firm could always do better 
with  the lower costs and unconstrained  profits of  the for-profit sector. 
Therefore, mixed production reveals that nonprofit costs are lower. 
In addition, mixed production  reveals a scarcity of output-preferring 
firms, because an infinite supply of  output-preferring firms would result 
in  a strictly nonprofit  industry. The following line of reasoning demon- 
strates this fact. In the long run, a firm will stay in an industry provided 
that at the prevailing price, it does at least as well as it would do outside 
the industry. For  simplicity, suppose that  a firm earns zero utility  if  it 
leaves the industry. When as  = 0, firms have no preference for output, and 
U(y,  T;  a,,)  = T,  so that in the long run, profit maximizers will remain in Medical Care Output and Productivity in the Nonprofit Sector  125 
an industry  provided  that the price weakly exceeds average costs. This 
leads to the familiar result that, given free entry, profit maximizers must 
produce at minimum average cost m in the long run. Profit maximizers 
remain in an industry provided that p  2 m,  but competition ensures that 
p 5 m. However, when p  = m,  firms with  > 0 earn positive utility in 
spite  of  their  zero  profits,  because  they  also  value  output. Therefore, 
output-preferring firms will find it optimal to remain in an industry even 
if  p  < m. Given an infinite supply of such firms, output preferrers will 
enter until the price falls below m.  At this point, all profit maximizers leave 
the industry, and all firms earn negative economic profits. Because profits 
are negative, the nonprofit constraint T I  0 fails to bind, and nonprofit 
status exacts no cost. As a result, all remaining firms become nonprofit.8 
As a  result,  we  will  consider the more  relevant  case in  which  output- 
preferring firms are scarce, and there exists an infinite supply of for-profit 
firms. 
Suppose we have only the quantity A  of firms with of. > 0, where the 
share of output-preferring firms with preference  a 5 ay  is given by the 
measure p(a,,).  We know that any profit-maximizing firms in the industry 
will choose for-profit status. We can also show that output preferrers will 
always choose nonprofit status. Specifically, since p 5 m,  any output pre- 
ferrers will choose to earn strictly negative profits under for-profit status. 
If p  < rn, it is obvious that output preferrers must earn negative profits. 
To see this fact for the case in whichp = m,  observe that profit maximizers 
earn exactly zero profits in this case. Since output preferrers act as if they 
have lower cost than profit maximizers, they will produce more output, 
and thus earn less profit. As a result, they can do strictly better by switch- 
ing to nonprofit status, because the cost reductions of nonprofit status will 
allow them to produce more output at a higher level of profit. However, 
even with scarce output preference, we need not have any profit maximiz- 
ers, or for-profit firms, in the industry. For firms with strong output prefer- 
ence, the nonpecuniary portion ofp* is positive, so they can charge a pecu- 
niary  price below p*. Therefore, output-preferring firms can survive at 
long-run prices strictly below m, the minimum average cost of a for-profit 
firm. Thus, if  there are enough output-preferring firms to satisfy market 
demand at a price below m,  no profit maximizers will enter the market. For- 
mally, let D(p)  be the market demand function, and y(p;  a,)  be the supply 
function of a firm with preferences s,.  If there exists a price p’ < m at 
which output preferrers can satisfy market  demand, then the long-run 
price cannot rise above p’,  and profit-maximizers do not enter. No profit 
maximizers enter if there exists p‘ < m  such that 
8. Fur a detailed analysis of  optimal profit status choice, see Lakdawalla and Philipson 
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If  this condition is satisfied, the industry will be strictly nonprofit,  and 
all firms will be output preferrers. Suppose that this condition cannot be 
satisfied, and that we thus have a mixed industry. In such an industry, all 
for-profit firms will be strict profit maximizers, and all nonprofit firms will 
be output preferrers. The results of the previous section then imply that 
firm scale must be higher in the nonprofit sector, because output preferrers 
rationally choose to operate at a higher scale, holding the output price 
c~nstant.~  In addition, the output-preferring nonprofit firms will produce 
this output at higher marginal cost, because they face a higher net pricep*. 
3.3.2 
It is well known that in both the short-term care (hospital) industry and 
the long-term care (nursing home) industry, nonprofit firms use more in- 
puts per unit of output and thus have larger unit costs than for-profit firms. 
For example, as is shown in the empirical analysis of this paper, the num- 
ber of full-time equivalent employees per bed-day is larger for nonprofit 
firms in these industries. This section argues that these empirical patterns 
do not stem from inefficient behavior by  nonprofit  firms, but  from the 
differences in preferences between nonprofit and for-profit firms. There are 
two major reasons for the observed differences  in unit costs. We have already 
seen that output-preferring firms choose nonprofit status, while profit max- 
imizers choose for-profit status. We show that the resulting differences in 
scale, when not accounted for, may induce larger unit costs among the out- 
put-preferring  nonprofit  firms.  Second,  we  show  that  input-preferring 
firms choose nonprofit status over for-profit status, so nonprofit firms will 
tend to be more input-preferring than for-profit firms. This generates differ- 
ences in unit costs across nonprofit and for-profit sectors, but these differ- 
ences reflect efficient behavior by firms with different preferences. 
First, we  show how differences in scale can generate differences in unit 
cost across the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. Suppose that one defines 
the observed productive efficiency as simply the observed average or mar- 
ginal monetary costs as is the norm in empirical studies on productivity 
differences. Scale differences across nonprofit and for-profit sectors may 
generate differences in average or marginal monetary costs which do not 
provide information about differences in productive efficiency. Therefore, 
comparing average monetary costs without considering scale may lead to 
misleading observations about productive efficiency. Recall from the previ- 
ous section that for-profit firms will always be profit maximizers. The pres- 
ence of  profit maximizers implies in turn that the long-run output price 
must  be equal to minimum  average monetary  cost m,  because  the for- 
profit firms needed to fill the residual demand (unmet by the scarce output 
Cost Differences under Mixed Production 
9. The larger scale of nonprofits is not naturally interpreted by  theories of nonprofits as 
cooperatives (e.g., Pauly and Redisch  1973), because they predict smaller labor forces than 
profit maximizers given that labor shares the residual gain. Medical Care Output and Productivity in the Nonprofit Sector  127 
preferrers) will produce at price m, the price at which their average costs 
are minimized. Recall that the nonprofit firms are output-preferring firms. 
Such firms will  produce strictly greater output than the for-profit firms. 
Specifically, they will set marginal cost equal to the net output price p*. 
Because  the  output-preferring  nonprofit  firms  face  higher  net  output 
pricesp*, they will produce at higher marginal cost. Of course, the relation 
between average cost across sectors is technically ambiguous after tax, but 
before-tax cost differences should remain. However, the higher marginal 
cost of nonprofit firms will tend to drive up average costs as well. In any 
event, provided that the cost reductions are not very large in magnitude, 
average costs will also be higher in the nonprofit sector. This difference in 
costs follows as an implication of efficient behavior under output prefer- 
ence and does not provide evidence of differences in productive efficiency 
across the two sectors. 
Second,  the  existence  of  input-preferring  firms  could  also  generate 
differences in average monetary costs which do not reflect inefficient be- 
havior by nonprofit firms. Consider the case of two inputs x,  and x,,  and 
a level of input preference over the input x1  indexed by  (Y  E [0, 11, where 
firms with ci  = 0 have no preference for using x,.  Again suppose that we 
have an infinite supply of profit-maximizing entrants with (Y = 0. We thus 
know that p 5 m. We also know that at any price p,  the input-preferring 
firms will produce more than the profit maximizers. If p  = m, the profit 
maximizers would earn zero profits. Since the input-preferring firms pro- 
duce more than profit maximizers, at this price they must earn negative 
profits. Clearly, ifp <  m,  the input preferrers must earn negative economic 
profits, because price lies below minimum average cost. Under these cir- 
cumstances, all input-preferring firms will optimally choose nonprofit sta- 
tus, because they would earn negative profits under for-profit status any- 
way. All profit maximizers will optimally choose for-profit status, because 
they have nothing valuable to gain by accepting a constraint on profits. As 
a result, all nonprofit firms have stronger preferences for x, than all for- 
profit firms. We know that, holding the cost function constant, input pref- 
erences cause firms to use more inputs at a given level of output, because 
they face different relative net input prices. Therefore, provided that the 
cost reductions afforded by  nonprofit status are not so large as to offset 
the force of input preferences, nonprojtjrms will have higher average costs, 
but not as a result ofproductive ineficiency. 
3.4  Research and Development by Nonprofit Firms 
In the short-term care industry, a large amount of research and develop- 
ment is conducted by nonprofit teaching hospitals.'O The property rights 
10. We  thank George Zanjani for providing us with a simpler derivation of the argument 
of this section than considered originally. 128  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
theory of  nonprofit firm behavior seems inconsistent with the predomi- 
nance of nonprofit firms in R&D, because it argues that nonprofit firms 
have weaker incentives to control costs. This section argues that profit- 
deviating firms often have stronger incentives to reduce the marginal cost 
of output through R&D than do profit maximizers. 
We  restrict our attention to R&D, which reduces the cost of producing 
extra quantity, although we discuss the straightforward application of our 
reasoning to a case in which R&D aims at increasing quality. Consider the 
case in which the firm maximizes a weighted sum of output and profits 
and has no input preferences: 
U(y,..)  = cxy  + (1 - a)n. 
The extension to general preferences is straightforward, but algebraically 
tedious. Suppose that each firm may choose to attain a level of technology 
0 in its cost function c(y, 0) where 0 reduces the marginal cost of output; 
cbe  5  0. Profits gross of investments in R&D are then defined as 
This implies that cost reduction raises gross profits more the larger the 
level of output; ~r~,  > 0. Attaining the level of technology 0 requires a re- 
search budget of  r(0) units of real consumption. In this setting, the firm 
solves 
maxcxy  + (1 - cx)[n(y,0) - r(0)l. 
J’fJ 
The first-order conditions are 
cx 
Tr,, = --, 
1-cx 
n,  = r,. 
Absent output preference a,  the first condition reduces to the standard 
profit-maximizing condition. The second condition equates the marginal 
increase in gross profits with the marginal cost of extra research. The sec- 
ond condition defines an implicit relationship between technology and out- 
put preference 0(a)  in which the benefit rises with output, because larger 
firms enjoy a larger reduction in costs for a given amount of R&D. Since 
output-preferring  firms are larger than profit-maximizing ones, implicit 
differentiation yields the result that a larger output preference expands 
R&D:” 
11. Define by D  the determinant of  the Hessian matrix. The second-order condition then 
implies that D > 0. Differentiating the first-order conditions yields dB/dCr  = [(I - nJl  - 
a)n,J/D.  Since TI, 5 0 at the optimal output choice, and nrtl  > 0, the result follows. Medical Care Output and Productivity in the Nonprofit Sector  129 
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This effect depends entirely on the reduction of marginal costs. Because 
marginal costs represent the price of output relative to profits on the mar- 
gin, reductions in  this relative price are more valuable to firms with  a 
stronger relative preference for output. Holding the cost function constant, 
output-preferring firms have a stronger incentive to invest in R&D be- 
cause it reduces costs more. Thus, contrary to property rights arguments, 
nonprofit firms have a stronger incentive to invest in R&D than for-profit 
firms. Of course, nonprofit firms also have lower costs than for-profit firms 
if they are given tax breaks on inputs. This provides a competing incentive 
against R&D expenditure. Provided that the cost reductions of nonprofit 
status are not too large, nonprofit firms will undertake more R&D spend- 
ing than for-profit firms. 
Although we have not explicitly considered quality enhancements in this 
paper, investments in quality-enhancing R&D would operate similarly.  l2 
Firms with stronger relative preferences for quality over profits would tend 
to  invest  more  in  quality-enhancing  R&D  than  other  firms. Quality- 
preferring firms would have a stronger incentive to adopt nonprofit status, 
because their profits would be lower than those of profit maximizers (be- 
cause they would forgo profits in the interest of raising quality), and be- 
cause the cost reductions of nonprofit status may help them finance higher 
quality output. 
3.5  Empirical Analysis of Productivity Differences in Long-Term Care 
This section provides an illustrative discussion of  some broad patterns 
on the productivity differences between nonprofits and for-profits in the 
U.S.  long-term care industry. We  will  be concerned  primarily  with  ad- 
dressing the claim that nonprofit firms use more inputs per unit of output 
in their larger scaled production. We argued above that output preferrers 
will have higher unconditional input demands, while input preferrers will 
have higher conditional input demands. We consider differences in input 
demands between for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes. Using the nurs- 
ing  home-level  data  from  the  1995 National  Nursing  Home  Survey 
(NNHS), we estimate conditional input demand as a function of proxies 
for market price p, output level y, and relative wages  w.  Specifically, we 
estimate the following cross-sectional spe~ification'~  of conditional input 
demand, for all facilities 
12. For an early study on quality-preferring  behavior by  nonprofit firms, see Newhouse 
(1970). 
13. Unfortunately, there exist no panel surveys of nursing homes. Such surveys would be 
useful if profit status were correlated with input use for other reasons that did not vary over 130  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
Table 3.1  Summary Statistics for Nursing Home Ownership and Input 
Intensity (1995) 
Mean  Std Dev  Min 
FTE employees 
FTE registered nurses 
FTE nurses’ aides 
FTE  doctors 
Nursing home beds’ 







































~~~  ~~~~ 
Notes; Data are from 1995 National Nursing Home Survey (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 1995). FTE = full-time equivalent. 
4NNHS  categorizes homes into one of four bed size categories: 0-49  beds, 50-99  beds, 100- 
199 beds, and 200+ beds. Beds variable constructed by assigning to each home the midpoint 
value of its size category, or in the case of the 200-t category, the minimum value. 
bIndex of services, constructed by NNHS. 
‘Dummy variable equal to 1 if facility is located in a standard metropolitan statistical area. 
“Dummy variable equal to 1 if facility is for-profit. 
Wxr>  = P, + P,W,)  + P,Ww,) + P,ln(.Y,) +  &,. 
The data used are summarized in table 3.1. We measure usage of four 
inputs: full-time equivalent registered nurses (RNs), full-time equivalent 
nurses’ aides, all full-time equivalent employees, and full-time equivalent 
doctors. To measure market price, we use the Medicaid per diem payment 
received by the nursing home. To  measure quantity of output, we use the 
number of beds present in the nursing home;I4 and to measure quality of 
output we  use an index of services provided, which is constructed within 
the NNHS. As a proxy for relative wages, we  use a dummy for location 
within a standard metropolitan statistical area. Due to urban amenities, 
relative wages (relative to the urban price level) should be lower in cities, 
that input usage should be higher. 
Table 3.2 reports the type of finding discussed on the differences in con- 
ditional input demand functions between nonprofit and for-profit homes. 
Controlling for output price, input price, and output level, nonprofit nurs- 
ing  homes  use  approximately  30  percent  more  RNs, 23  percent  more 
--  -  ~  ~~  ~- 
time. Indeed, we  are not aware of  any data sets on the effect of  profit status conversion 
on productivity. 
14. Although the NNHS does not directly report bed size for each facility, it does place 
each facility into one of four size categories: 1-49  beds, 50-99  beds, 100-199  beds, and 200 
beds or more. We construct a measure of bed size by assigning to each home in the first three 
categories the number of beds equal to the midpoint of the category. For example, the homes 
in the first category are assigned the value of  25 beds. To homes with more than 200 beds 
we  assign the value of 200. Table 3.2  Effect of Nursing Home Ownership on Input Intensity (1995) 
Log FTE RNs  Log FTE Aidesa  Log FTE Employees  Log FTE Doctors 
Coefficient  r-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant 
Log nursing home beds 
Log medicaid per diem 
Services provided 
City 
For-profi  t 
R2 









-7.96  -  1.77* 
17.35  0.94* 
4.55  0.24* 
4.16  0.05 
4.87  0.07* 
-6.28  -0.23* 
0.55 
1,180 
-5.53  -1.51* 
27.76  0.94* 
3.25  0.35* 
0.38  0.21** 
2.19  O.ll* 
-7.48  -0.25* 
0.63 
1,202 
-4.753  -1.81*  -  1.684 
3  1.482  0.20**  1.786 
5.031  0.38**  1.782 
3.866  0.06  0.535 
1.844  -0.44  -0.617 
-9.041  -0.10  -0.865 
0.02 
152 
Note:  All 1-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
aAides are nurses’ aides. 
*Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
**Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence. 132  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
nurses’ aides, and 25 percent more employees. All these coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient for doctors is 
negative, but insignificant. The standard errors on all the coefficients rise 
dramatically in the regression for doctors, because we lose almost 90 per- 
cent of the sample. This relates to a finding reported by Borjas, Frech, and 
Ginsburg (1983), who did not find significant wage rate differences be- 
tween nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes. This result is consistent with 
input preference among nonprofit nursing homes. Substantially similar re- 
sults were obtained for the unconditional input demand equation, in which 
the output measures were excluded. This would also be consistent with out- 
put preference. Further simple analysis was consistent with output pref- 
erence: Regression of total beds on profit status revealed that nonprofit 
homes have, on average, 6.5 more beds than for-profit homes,15 and that 
this difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
These findings relate to previous studies on the differential input use 
across the two regulatory forms. Table 3.3 shows the estimated specifica- 
tions of Borjas, Frech, and Ginsburg (1983), which they use to advance 
the property rights theory of nursing homes. They advance the claim that 
nonprofit firms dissipate profits by paying abnormally high wages to work- 
ers. On the surface, the theory behind this regression is flawed. If workers 
in nonprofit nursing homes really received rents for identical labor, there 
would  be long queues  of  people waiting  to work  in  nonprofit  nursing 
homes, and there could not be an equilibrium in the labor market. This the- 
oretical objection aside, Borjas et al. do not even find evidence of a wage 
differential. Table 3.3 reports the results of regressing the wages of nurses 
on the individual characteristics of the nurses, a set of regional and geo- 
graphical dummies, and the ownership status of the nursing home. Con- 
trolling for observable characteristics, there is found to be no statistically 
significant difference between the wages paid by secular nonprofit homes 
and those paid by  for-profit homes. In fact, church-run nonprofit homes 
pay a lower wage than for-profit homes, perhaps due to the availability of 
workers who wish to serve the church for nonpecuniary reasons. The only 
evidence Borjas et al. point to comes from government-run nursing homes, 
which apparently do pay a wage which is about 6-7  percent higher than 
the for-profit wage. We will not dwell too long on this finding, because we 
have not attempted to model government-run homes, which would be sub- 
ject to various political economic considerations. At any rate, it is possible 
that governments impose unobservable quality  standards on employees 
and reward them accordingly. While wage rates for a homogeneous unit of 
labor cannot differ across firms in an equilibrium, firms may use inputs 
more or less intensively, depending on their preferences. 
15. Since the average for-profit home has about 130 beds, this roughly translates into a 5 
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Table 3.3  Effect of Nursing Home Ownership on Wage Rates for 
Nurses (1973-74) 
Log Wage Rate 
Mean*  Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Constant 
Years of education 














































































Source: Borjas, Frech, and Ginsburg (19831, table 2. 
Note; Data are from 1973-74 National Nursing Home Survey. n.a. = not applicable. t-Statis- 
tics are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
“Refers to mean of independent variable. 
bReceived in the past year. 
‘Equal to 1 if nursing home located in a standard metropolitan statistical area. 
*Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
**Significantly different from zero with 90% confidence. 
In tables 3.4 and 3.5, we  reproduce the results of other authors whose 
analyses of hospitals are broadly consistent with our findings for nursing 
homes. In table 3.4, we report the results of Sloan and Steinwald (1980), 
who study input intensity across nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Sloan 
and  Steinwald  find  that  the  number  of  full-time equivalent  registered 
nurses per hospital bed is roughly 25 percent higher in nonprofit hospitals, 
while the number of full-time equivalent nonnursing employees is roughly 
12 percent higher. No significant effect was found for licensed practical 
nurses, who might be viewed as cheaper substitutes for physicians. Since 
the dependent variable is normalized by the number of beds, they do not 
include output as a regressor and thus do not strictly estimate a condi- 
tional input demand function. However, they do control for the wage di- 134  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
Table 3.4  Effect of Hospital Ownership on Input Intensity (1969-75) 
Log FTE RNs  Log FTE LPNs  Log Other FTEs 
per Bed  per Bed.’  per Bed 



















-  1.82  -0.72** 
3.00  -0.04** 
-3.64  0.03 
-4.90  -0.03 
-1.49  0.03 
1.38  0.05 
-0.34  -0.13* 
0.12 
6,016 
-  1  .80  0.31**  1.82 
-  1.74  0.01  1.37 
0.37  0.01  0.26 
-0.32  -0.12*  -3.33 
0.41  0.03  1.22 
0.86  0.12*  5.00 
-2.20  -0.01  -0.44 
0.18 
6,O 16 
Source; Sloan and Steinwald (1980), table 8.1. 
Note:  A variety of included regressors not of interest here are not reported. All regressions control for 
a hospital-specific fixed effect. t-Statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity. 
“LPNs  are licensed practical nurses. 
bWages for the class of employees in dependent variable. 
‘Statewide proportion of population eligible for Medicaid. 
“Statewide proportion of population eligible for Medicare. 
‘Dummy variable indicating presence of medical school. 
‘Dummy variable indicating presence of nursing school. 
*Significantly different from zero with 95% confidence. 
**Significantly different from zero with YO‘%,  confidence. 
rectly, and they control for market price using the proportion of people 
covered by Medicare or Medicaid. Therefore, their results also support the 
conclusion that holding output fixed, nonprofit  hospitals use more RNs 
and more nonnursing staff. 
In table 3.5, we reproduce the results of Gentry and Penrod (1998), who 
analyze the output of hospitals across profit status. Table 3.5 displays some 
aggregate patterns consistent with evidence that nonprofit hospitals have 
more beds and discharges, as well  as longer durations of care than for- 
profit hospitals. In addition, they are more likely to have emergency rooms 
and delivery rooms. On this level of aggregation it appears that, for a vari- 
ety of output measures, nonprofit hospitals produce more than for-profit 
hospitals. Since nonprofit hospitals also have more employees, it is clear 
that they have higher unconditional input demands than for-profit hospi- 
tals. Finally, we can see that nonprofits are more likely to have teaching 
programs than for-profits, programs which are strong indicators of  R&D 
expenditure. This is consistent with our prediction that output-preferring 
nonprofit institutions are more likely to invest in R&D. Medical Care Output and Productivity in the Nonprofit Sector  135 
Table 3.5  Effect of Hospital Ownership on Output (1995) 
Nonprofit  For-Profit  Public 
Median bed sized  170  138  70 
Median discharges (yearlyp  4,975  3,609  1,233 
Median length of stay (days)”  5.51  5.11  5.46 
Median number of employeesA  520  330  161 
Percent with delivery room  74.7  62.7  72.8 
Percent with teaching program  29.2  12.7  9.1 
Percent with emergency room  97.8  93.2  99 
Source: Gentry and Penrod (1998) 
Note: Based on a sample of 4,996 general short-term hospitals from HCFA’s public use file 
of  1995 Medicare Cost Reports. 
dFor these  variables,  the  Kruskal-Wallis test  of  equivalent  distribution across  ownership 
types was rejected at a 0.01 level. 
3.6  Conclusion 
Although the nonprofit sector is responsible for a majority of the pro- 
duction of health care in many countries, little is known about the eco- 
nomic  forces contributing to productivity  differences between the non- 
profit and for-profit sectors. In this paper we  argued that some puzzling 
empirical regularities may be understood using the analysis of endogenous 
nonprofit status choice studied in Lakdawalla and Philipson (1997). We 
contrasted  our arguments to  the well-known claim that  nonprofits  are 
made inefficient by their lack of well-defined property rights. Most impor- 
tantly, the property rights theory cannot explain why firms would volunta- 
rily choose an inferior arrangement of property rights in the first place. 
The analysis here suggests that one should be more cautious in interpret- 
ing differences in productivity, because the efficient behavior of a firm will 
depend on its objectives. We  argued that firms which choose nonprofit 
status are as efficient as those which choose for-profit status even though 
they  utilize more inputs per  unit  of  output produced. Furthermore, we 
predicted  that nonprofits would invest more in cost-reducing R&D than 
for-profits, contrary to the qualitative arguments of property rights theory. 
In addition, we  argued that although these productivity differences lead 
them to have higher average costs, nonprofit firms will drive out for-profit 
firms in competitive markets. These predictions were consistent with the 
empirical finding reported from the long-term care industry showing that 
nonprofit nursing homes use 23 to 30 percent more labor inputs (full-time 
equivalents) than for-profit homes of the same size. It is also consistent 
with earlier empirical findings that  in  mixed industries, nonprofit  firms 
tend to be larger and more R&D intensive but less efficient than for-profit 
firms, while at the same time they tend to be more numerous than their 
for-profit counterparts. 136  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
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Comment  Richard G. Frank 
The paper by Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla extends a long line 
of research on the behavior of nonprofit organizations in the health care 
sector. This paper focuses on the objective function of nonprofit health 
care providers and their  allocative and productive  efficiency. These are 
concerns that have challenged and vexed economists for over thirty years 
(Frank and Salkever 1994). The paper also takes up two  other topics: 
(1)  cost and productivity differences among health care providers under 
mixed for-profit and nonprofit production; and (2) research and develop- 
ment by nonprofit firms. The empirical analysis focuses primarily on own- 
ership, organizational preferences, and efficiency. I will briefly summarize 
the theoretical models proposed by Philipson and Lakdawalla, point out 
the main implication stemming from the models, and review the empirical 
strategy adopted for exploring behaviors of nonprofit nursing homes and 
hospitals. 
The Basic Model 
The point  of  departure for  the theoretical analysis  is a  competitive 
model where free entry holds and firms are price takers. A general objec- 
tive function for the health care provider is  set out:  U = U(y,  x,  a).  It 
consists of three arguments, output (y),  inputs (x),  and profit (n).  The 
firms pursue their  objectives subject  to a production  constraint  and  a 
break-even constraint. Because nonprofit organizations receive charitable 
donations, production costs can exceed revenues from sales. 
Analysis of the model yields several implications: 
0  If the firm is not an “input preferrer” (Ux = 0), it pursues cost mini- 
mization. This is true of both profit-maximizing for-profit organiza- 
tions (Ux  = Uy = 0) and output-preferring nonprofits (Uy > 0). 
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If the firm “prefers inputs” (Ux  > 0), it will not be allocatively effi- 
cient. 
Nonprofit firms of all types will use more inputs than for-profit firms. 
Only input preferrers will have higher conditional input demands than 
for-profits. 
Output preferring firms will have higher  marginal costs and higher 
output than for-profit firms. 
The availability of donations and tax breaks will tend to drive out for- 
profit firms. 
Philipson and Lakdawalla use this model as a guide for interpreting statis- 
tical analysis of the behavior of nursing homes and hospitals. 
Evidence 
The empirical analysis presented by Philipson and Lakdawalla focuses 
on the analysis of input demand functions. They present new results for a 
national sample of nursing homes and review the analyses of others for 
the hospital  sector. There are two important refutable propositions  that 
Philipson and Lakdawalla are seeking to test as a means of assessing the 
theory they have advanced. The first is  that the estimated input demand 
functions are consistent with cost minimization: that is, the demand curves 
are downward-sloping. This would be inconsistent with the input-preferrer 
formulation. Second, holding constant quality and output quantity, non- 
profit firms would use more inputs. This offers another test of the input- 
preferrer formulation. 
Some previous  research  has provided  evidence  that nonprofit  health 
care providers do not allocate inputs in a fashion consistent with cost mini- 
mization. Goldman and Grossman (1  988) estimated production functions 
for community  health centers and tested whether  the ratio  of marginal 
products was equal to the ratio of factor payments. They rejected the pres- 
ence of that cost-minimizing equilibrium condition in that market. Frank 
and Taube (1987) took a similar approach to studying the behavior of am- 
bulatory mental health care providers.  They too rejected the proposition 
that those providers were hiring inputs in a manner consistent with cost 
minimization. This previous work argues against the profit-maximization 
and output-preferring nonprofit formulations. 
Philipson and Lakdawalla’s empirical work is aimed directly at the input 
demand function for nursing homes. In general the literature has tended 
to formulate input demand models in the health sector either as technical 
input demand functions which are derived by assuming cost minimization 
and no other behavior, or as a behavioral input demand function where 
profit  maximization  or some other  objective  is assumed. In the former 
case, for  a two-input  production  process  the Cobb-Douglas  estimating 
equation might take the form Medical Care Output and Productivity in the Nonprofit Sector  139 
where A  is  a constant incorporating Hicks-neutral technical  change, w, 
and w,  are input prices and Q is the quality-adjusted output. In the latter 
case the model might take the form 
x = Awpwfp, 
where p  is  the output price for the profit-maximizing firm. Under these 
types of formulations ownership is specified in the context of the Hicks- 
neutral technical change term. Hence A  = a,  + a,Profit (where Profit is 
an ownership dummy variable). The specification used by  Philipson and 
Lakdawalla is something of a hybrid. They estimate a model of the form 
x =  Aw"pPQe. 
They estimate models for four types of labor inputs of nursing homes: 
registered nurses, nurses'  aides, all employees, and physicians. Separate 
equations are estimates for each input. On the right-hand side of the re- 
gression models are nursing home  beds (as a proxy for quantity given 
nearly full occupancy), Medicaid per diem reimbursement (a measure of 
supply price), an index of the range of services provided by  the nursing 
home (as an indicator of quality), a dummy variable indicating whether a 
nursing home is located in a city (as an indicator of relatively low wages 
for nursing home staff), and an ownership dummy variable. 
The results reported show that holding constant beds, reimbursement, 
location, and the services index, for-profit nursing homes demand signifi- 
cantly lower quantities of all labor inputs except physicians. The magni- 
tude of the response varies from about 24 percent for aides to 32 percent 
for registered nurses. These estimates are supportive of the input-preferrer 
hypothesis. Two factors cast some uncertainty on this result. First, there 
is evidence suggesting that nonprofit nursing homes tend to be of higher 
quality than their for-profit counterparts. Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1  986) 
analyze complaint data from  the state of  Wisconsin and find evidence 
showing lower rates of complaints by customers of nonprofit homes. Ger- 
tler  and  Waldman  (1991) also  find  evidence suggesting that  nonprofit 
homes are of higher quality. If higher quality is correlated with levels of 
staffing, as one could plausibly conjecture, then the results obtained by 
Philipson  and Lakdawalla may  be sensitive to  their ability to measure 
quality. This is not just a problem for Philipson and Lakdawalla, but one 
which plagues most empirical work on cost and production in health care. 
The services index is the sole measure of quality in the model. The con- 
struction of the variable is not well specified. While it is plausible that the 
range of services is correlated with quality, it is not directly linked to com- 
mon notions of quality. Thus the degree to which the estimated coefficient 
for the ownership dummy reflects the structure of firm preferences versus 
differences in quality remains somewhat uncertain. 
The second source of uncertainty is that if the input-preferrer formula- 140  Tomas Philipson and Darius Lakdawalla 
tion holds, then one would expect to reject cost minimization,  which is 
weakly tested by assessing the shape of the input demand functions. The 
evidence for nursing homes is consistent with a downward-sloping demand 
curve if one accepts the proposition  that city location offers amenities, 
which implies that “relative wages (relative to urban price level) should 
be lower in cities.” There are other explanations for what a city location 
dummy might represent, and it may be premature to place such a strong in- 
terpretation on the positive coefficient estimate for that variable. The find- 
ing is further complicated when Philipson and Lakdawalla consider econo- 
metric results from hospital markets that provide evidence of  downward- 
sloping  input  demand  curves  and  higher  levels  of  input  demand  by 
nonprofits (conditional on beds). 
Concluding Comment 
The paper by Philipson and Lakdawalla offers a theoretical discussion 
which provides some new ways to interpret differences in observed pat- 
terns of behavior by for-profit and nonprofit health care providers. It also 
suggests reasons why health care markets might so often have mixes of for- 
profit and nonprofit firms. The authors offer some refutable propositions 
and provide some evidence offering support for the input-preferrer struc- 
ture of preferences among nonprofit nursing  homes. Unfortunately,  the 
empirical work offered by  Philipson and Lakdawalla is plagued with dif- 
ficulties in measuring quality, which have often frustrated empirical analy- 
ses of health care providers. The objective function of nonprofit nursing 
homes (and health care providers generally) remains uncertain and contin- 
ues  to pose  a challenge to economists interested  in  the productivity of 
different institutional forms in the health sector. 
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